Clinical Pathways to Ethically Substantive Autonomy by Drake, Philip & Toddington, Stuart
311
Clinical Pathways to 
Ethically Substantive 
Autonomy
Philip Drake, Professor Stuart Toddington*
There is no shortage of support for the idea that ethics should be incorporated into the academic 
and professional curriculum� There is a difference, however, between, on  the one hand,  teaching 
professionals  about ethics, and, on the other, demanding that  they  give ethical expression to the 
range of professional skills they are expected to apply daily in their work� If this expression is not 
to be perfunctory, ethical judgement must be genuinely integrated into the professional skill set� 
The mark of integration in this regard is the capacity for autonomous judgement� Ethical autonomy 
cannot be achieved by a mechanical, rule-bound and circumstance-specific checklist of ethical do’s 
and don’ts, and it is only partially achieved by a move from mechanistic rules to ‘outcome based’ 
processes�1 Rather, professional ethical autonomy presupposes not only a formal understanding 
of the requirements of an ethical code of conduct, but a genuine engagement with the substantive 
values and techniques that enable practitioners to interpret and apply principles confidently over a 
range of circumstances� It is not then, that ethical skill is not valued by the legal profession or legal 
education, or that the shortfall of ethical skill goes unacknowledged, it is rather that the  language 
of professional ethics struggles to break free from the cautious circularity that is the mark of its 
formal expression� To require a professional to ‘act in their client’s interests’, or ‘act in accordance 
with the expectations of the profession’ or act ‘fairly and effectively’ are formal, infinitely 
ambiguous and entirely safe suggestions; to offer a substantive account of what, specifically, those 
interests might be, or what expectations we should have, are rather more contentious� Fears of 
dogma and a narrowing of discretion do, of course, accompany the idea of a search for ethical 
* Philip Drake, Senior Lecturer, Law School, Univeristy of Huddersfield� Professor Toddington, Law School,
Univeristy of Huddersfield�
1 The new SRA Handbook emphasises a move to ‘outcomes focused regulation’� In this document the SRA say:
“Responsibility for meeting the requirements in the Handbook, and for operating effective systems and 
processes, lies with you� In the SRA Code of Conduct (the Code) in particular, we have stripped out a lot of the 
detail of the previous Code to empower you to implement the right systems and controls for your clients and 
type of practice� You will have more flexibility in how you achieve the right outcomes for your clients, which 
will require greater judgement on your part�”
This reference to greater judgement [on the part of the practising lawyer] is clearly an acknowledgement that 
autonomy is now necessary in ethical skill application� This is to be welcomed, or point is simply that no amount 
of contingent examples of ethical rule application can impart the attribute of autonomy to a learner� (See S�3�2)
 http://www�sra�org�uk/solicitors/freedom-in-practice/OFR/ofr-quick-guide�page
312
International Journal of Clinical Legal Education Issue 19
substance, and caution is to be expected in response to it� Notwithstanding these anxieties, there 
would appear to be no coherent alternative to the aspiration to substantive autonomy, and this 
must remain the goal of teaching legal ethics� In light of this, the problem facing educationalists is 
then perhaps expressed more diplomatically in terms of how ethical skill might be substantively 
developed, imparted, and integrated into a genuinely comprehensive conception of professional 
skill�
Clinical education can go a long way to solving this problem: exposure to the practical tasks of 
lawyering is the surest and best way of raising consciousness in this regard: ‘Hands-on’ is  good - 
and consciousness-raising is a step in the direction of autonomy, but raw experience and elevated 
awareness is not enough� We know that our most influential theories of learning tells us that it is 
in the process of reflection upon problem solving that the practitioner begins to take autonomous 
control of skill development�2 In the view of the author, reflection, requires content and direction, 
and in this paper, with the aid of three models of skill integration inspired by Nigel Duncan’s 
detailed analysis and video reconstruction of the ethical and technical skill deficiencies brought to 
light by R v Griffiths,3 we attempt to specify what might be understood in this regard: Reflective 
content refers to the discrete interests and values that compete to produce tension in what we 
will refer to the ‘matrix’ of concerns that feature in all forms of dispute resolution; reflective 
direction points to an engagement with the resources and techniques that can empower critical 
and autonomous judgment� In the context of a clinical process broadly structured by the insights 
of Wenger and by Rest’s model of ethical skill,4 guided reflection so specified thus serves as an 
interface between on the one hand, indeterminate ethical form, and, on the other, the substantive 
ethical wisdom to be found in the repository of values that underpin the very idea of the legal 
enterprise� 
The Matrix of Technical and Ethical Skill: Three Models of Integration 
When we introduce the idea of ethical behaviour into the concept of professional skill we face a 
logical problem of greater complexity than might first be imagined� Skill-sets can be compiled and 
evaluated simply as linear sets of practical means in relation to a given end (task or enterprise)� If 
engineering, for example, a range of basic and discrete craft skills might be specified and enumerated 
as a series: measuring, cutting, milling, filing, welding and so on; the set might be enlarged as other 
basic skills, or other more advanced skills are added on to the linear series� Here the idea of a linear 
series of skills will be contrasted with a systematic or organically integrated set of skills� The linear 
analogy is probably an oversimplification even in basic engineering – it is probably true to say that 
an integrated set of basic skills in combination is minimally required to perform any engineering 
task, and so the distinction we seek to establish is perhaps a matter of degree� But the problem 
about ‘adding on’ or rather, ‘adding in’ ethical skills to an accepted linear set of professional skills 
or competences, is that ethical skill in the form of autonomous moral judgment does not merely 
enlarge the set of skills and thus increase the range of tasks that might be undertaken� Rather, the 
2 See David A� Kolb, Experiential learning: experience as the source of learning and development� (Englewood Cliffs, 
N�J, London : Prentice-Hall) 1984
3 See R v Griffiths [2006] All ER (D) 19� See also Nigel Duncan “Preparing for the Challenge of a Corrupt 
Environment” (elfa-afde�eu/app/download/5788681553/n�duncan�pdf)� See video at www�teachinglegalethics�org 
under ‘resource library’ - ‘teaching materials’, then scroll down to ‘Nigel Duncan’�
4 See fn� 18 infra
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ethical dimensional of skill application radically and qualitatively changes not only the nature of 
skill application, but the criteria by which we might judge the successful (competent and skilful) 
completion of the task in hand� In fact, adding in ethical autonomy to the lawyers skill set might 
profoundly affect the understanding of the goals of the entire legal enterprise� That is to say, we 
cannot conceive of skill acquisition for lawyers in linear terms, but rather must approach the issue 
of skills in a holistic way: ethical judgement cannot be ‘added in’ or ‘bolted on’ to a skill-set it must 
be suitably integrated� Relieving the pressure of this abstraction we offer three familiar scenarios 
that highlight certain ethical constants (judgments about interests and values) that constitute a 
matrix of concerns common to all lawyer/client interactions� There are five such: (a) the interest of 
the client, (b), the provisions of relevant law – statute, common law principle - practice guidelines, 
(c) the requirements of the professional ethical code, (d), the orthodoxly accepted set of clerical, 
technical and administrative skills expected of practising lawyers, (e), the underlying social or 
moral purpose of the law� The three scenarios present these concerns in a way that shows that 
our understanding of what is to count as ‘skilful execution’ and ‘successful outcome’ varies in 
relation to our conception of what constitutes a suitably professional model of skill integration 
and application�5 The models are drawn from reality, but it is their hypothetical or ‘ideal-typical’ 
validity that is important in what follows� The first model (See the video reconstruction of stages 
1, 2 and 3 of R v Griffiths)6 provides a convenient illustration of what we have called the ‘the 
automatically integrated’ model�
(i) ‘Automatically’ integrated model
What we refer to as an ‘automatically integrated’ model occurs where prima facie it appears that 
the client interest, the range of orthodox technical skills, and the quality of ethical judgement 
required to tie their application together are all automatically entwined� A good example of this 
is provided by the role play corrective to R v Griffiths constructed by Nigel Duncan (See video at 
www�teachinglegalethics�org)� Here, an estate agent approaches a solicitor with a view to acting 
on the purchase of a property appearing on the market at a remarkably low price� The solicitor 
is aware that the vendors had recently been convicted of drug dealing and money-laundering and 
immediately perceived a connection between the low selling price of £43,000 (against a market value 
of approximately £150,000) and the attempt to dispose of assets prior to potential confiscation 
under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002�7 Despite what actually occurred,8 the solicitor’s statutory 
duty in this situation could not be clearer: it is to report any such suspicion� Similarly, it seems 
a straightforward matter for the solicitor to point out to the prospective purchaser that it simply 
would not be in their interest to acquire criminal property in this regard� It would be inevitably 
confiscated and very possibly the discrepancy between the selling price and the actual market value 
might be recovered from the client� If this course of action is followed, the happy coincidence of (a) 
the interests of the client, (b) the provisions of the statute, (c) the maxims of the professional code 
5 By’skill integration’ we are trying to convey the message that Julia Black expresses such that ‘ethics is what raises 
competence to professionalism’� Julia Black “Legal Education and Training and its Interaction with Regulation”� 
(Paper to the LETR Symposium, Manchester, July 2012 (forthcoming )�
6 R v Griffiths [2006] EWCA Crim 2155,� See video at www�teachinglegalethics�org under ‘resource library’ - 
‘teaching materials’ then scroll down to ‘Nigel Duncan’� See fn 3 supra
7 See: Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s�330 (1) ‘Failing to make a required disclosure’�
8 See Nigel Duncan “Preparing for the Challenge of a Corrupt Environment” (Op�Cit� fn 3 )
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(d) the technical and administrative competence skills of the lawyer, and (e) the underlying purpose 
of the legislation, come together to produce an automatically balanced and cohesive solution to the 
situation� It would require (as it did in the actual events leading to the prosecution of the solicitor 
and the client) a determined effort not to act skilfully and diligently in serving cohesively interests 
(a) – (e)� Thus R v Griffiths provides an invaluable general model which, when analysed, serves as 
an interface to a more focused level of reflection: the student or future practitioner takes the first 
step to ethical autonomy when he or she becomes aware of the matrix of concerns that lie between 
(a) – (e)� Guided reflection by the tutor can bring these concerns systematically to the fore� This 
contributes not only to elevated ethical awareness, but allows the student or practitioner to push 
beyond the formal identification of the problem of skill integration towards the kind of knowledge 
and techniques required to advance substantive solutions to it� Models two and three below 
present this ‘matrix of concerns’ in more problematic permutation� 
(ii) ‘Problematically’ integrated model 
R v Griffiths provided a convenient illustration of an integrated solution and a valuable model to aid 
our analysis of a problem, but most lawyer/client  interactions involve ‘problematically integrated’ 
situations: A good example of this  kind of interaction occurs in cases where legal advice and 
skilful manipulation of financial arrangements is required to effect, say, a tax burden reduction� 
Here, ‘the client interest’ (‘easing’ the tax burden) and the technical skills of the tax lawyer or 
accountant might appear to conflict with the apparent clarity of the ethically redistributive and 
progressive intentions of the statute� But the economic and psychological models that form the 
rationale behind the legislative intention are highly contentious�9 In addition, what might emerge 
as an expression of the client interest is ethically and philosophically uncertain ( for example, the 
client might genuinely be appalled by the leniency of the law in this regard and insist on paying 
more tax than is legally required) � Here, then the integration of the matrix concerns (a) – (e) is 
disrupted and made problematic� 
(iii) Unintegrated model 
A third model (drawn from reality, but which could plausibly be mooted hypothetically) is a 
situation where the ‘client interest’ and what counts as the ‘technical skill’ of the lawyer are 
entirely antithetical to the universally understood and accepted moral intentions of the legislation: 
i�e�, and e�g�, ingeniously defending torture at Guantánamo Bay for the benefit of providing legal
immunity for the U�S� military�10 If we assume, ideal-typically, a civilised legislative intention and a 
9 One need only to refer to the immense controversy arising from proponents and critics of supply-side economics 
and in particular, the issue of the ‘Laffer Curve’ See, for example, Arthur Laffer, “The Laffer Curve: Past Present 
and Future” ( Heritage Foundation June 1, 2004) http://www�heritage�org/research/reports/2004/06/the-laffer-
curve-past-present-and-future
10 See Richard B Builder & Detlev F Vagts, “Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture” (2004) American 
Society of International Law, at pp 689-695� The advice provided was that the President as Commander-in-Chief 
has constitutional authority to disregard treaty or statutory prohibitions on the use of torture or other coercive 
interrogation techniques in conducting the “war on terror”�
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principled ‘client interest’ in a democratic society,11 we have an example of an entirely unintegrated 
application of technical skill and ethical judgment: The ‘skill’ required of lawyers in this situation 
is what ethical common sense would regard as the capacity to subvert or nullify the legislative  and 
democratic purpose of the law to serve the immoral and unconstitutional interests of the ‘client’� 
A fully rational reconstruction of this interaction from an ideal-typically ‘integrated’ perspective 
could not, we argue, regard this permutation of technical competence, client interest and ethical 
judgment as unproblematically to be regarded as ‘skilful’�12 
An Interface Between Ethical Form and Ethical Substance 
When we speak about an integrated approach to legal education in this sense of producing a 
cognitive grasp of the relations between skill, interests, legislative intent, and ethical judgment 
what we are striving to do is express a maximally comprehensive notion of high professional 
competence� We noted in our introductory remarks that mechanistic and rule-bound regimes, 
and a pathologically cautious formalism fall short of our aspirations in this regard� Ethical skill 
can sensibly be understood only as a capacity for autonomous, reflective and accomplished ethical 
judgement - and pure form cannot facilitate this autonomy� Endlessly insisting on the need for 
reflection will not magically produce the level of accomplishment we desire, rather we must openly 
and honestly specify the content and direction of reflection� By the same token, if the educational 
task is to develop an understanding of ethical skill, impart it, and ensure that it becomes integrated 
into a genuinely comprehensive conception of professional skill, we need to do more than compile 
wish-lists of virtues that we would hope to find evenly distributed throughout the profession� 
Such lists are not to be criticised on the basis of their formalism per se, formal articulation of any 
problem is not only methodologically unavoidable, in the context of ethical endeavour it is also 
vitally important to us in creating as Potter points out, a universal focus of hope�13 
Lists of desirable virtues thus provide an initial formal orientation:� Rowe et al recently and rightly 
suggest that our understanding of ‘professionalism’ ought to include a recognition of ‘the broader 
implications of work’� This involves:14 
• considering	the	interests	and	values	of	clients	and	others
• providing	high	quality	services	at	fair	cost
• maintaining	independence	of	judgement
• embodying	honour	integrity	and	fair	play
• being	truthful	and	candid
• exhibiting	diligence	and	punctuality
• showing	courtesy	and	respect	towards	others
11 The question here, of course, is who is the client? The government and the military are archetypal public bodies 
and in it could be(should be) argued law have no interests antithetical to the public interest� See in particular 
“The Meaning of Public Authority Under the Human Rights Act” - Seventh Report of Session 2003–04” in 
relation to s� 6(3)(b) of the HRA 1998�
12 This resonates with Julia Black’s aphorism� See fn� 4 supra
13 See Potter 2005: 24
14 M� Rowe et al “Professionalism in Pre-Practice Legal Education: An Insight Into the Universal Nature of 
Professionalism and the Developemnt of Professional Identity�” The Law Teacher (2012 Vol 46 No�2) pp�123-124
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• complying	with	rules	and	expectations	of	the	profession.
• Managing	law	practice	effectively	and	efficiently
• engaging	in	professional	self-development
• nurturing	quality	of	life
Additionally, ‘ professionals’ should support the aims of the legal profession by:
• providing	access	to	justice
• upholding	the	vitality	and	effectiveness	of	the	legal	system
• promoting	justice	fairness	and	morality
• and	encouraging	diversity.
They go on to say that traditional law teaching does little to address these values and attributes 
which could be said “to be at the core of lawyers’ professional identity”� 15 
There is nothing in this list that anyone would wish to disagree with; but we should by now be 
aware that it is the purity of the form – quite literally, the absence of substance – that lies behind 
this guarantee of unanimous approval� Thus despite the unanimity, as Rowe et al, point out, little 
is done, effectively, to promote these virtues� There is no paradox, however, once we acknowledge 
that this failure lies in the inability of legal ethical discourse to break free from these formalist 
constraints� Ironically, Rowe’s list of virtues provide a good illustration of the problem� This is 
not to criticise tout court what is listed; the analytical process, as noted, renders this formal first step 
logically unavoidable in identifying the practical problem and providing a systematic orientation 
to its separable dimensions� Its separable dimensions concern, formally, what might be involved 
in successfully serving ‘the interests and values of clients’ and ‘others’; of providing ‘high quality’ 
at a ‘fair cost’; of encouraging ‘independence of judgement’; ‘honour integrity and fair play’; of 
meeting ‘expectations of the profession’; ‘professional self-development’; ‘quality of life’ and so 
on� But the enumeration of these dimensions of the problem is not a solution to the problem, 
nor even an identification of what is required to synthesise a solution to the problem� What is 
enumerated here is infinitely interpretable: a list of ‘blanks’ that must urgently be ‘filled in’ by 
substantive information� It seems that these empty formal shells cry out for substantive ethical 
content, but that we are condemned to proceed in circles, trying to fathom what, concretely, it 
means to teach lawyers to be ‘fair’, ‘effective’, ‘honourable’ and what is entailed by making them 
aware of the ‘broader implications of their work’� 
Progress beyond this formalism - progress towards professional ethical skill seen as substantive 
ethical autonomy – demands of us that we engage with what we are now naturally conditioned to 
avoid: ‘value-judgments’, ‘essentially contested concepts’ or ‘metaphysical’ notions� We live, as 
Alisdair MacIntyre16 pointed out, in an age of Emotivism: a world where philosophical orthodoxy 
- and the post-rational rejection of the orthodoxy - both regard the engagement with concrete value 
as not a proper topic of rational or ‘scientific’ discussion� Hope, however, lies in the fact that law, 
in a profound sense, accepts this moral impasse and attempts to fashion and stabilize justificatory 
norms as a response to the potential for disagreement inevitably arising from it� Given this, there 
is no reason why we should not find answers to what is skilful, fair, effective and honourable 
15 Ibid� Rowe Law Teacher p� 123,4
16 Alisdair MacIntyre After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2nd� Edition, Duckworth, London) 1982, pp�6-10�
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within the practice of law by looking at the values that underpin the practical wisdom of the very 
idea of law� We find this suggestion increasingly in contemporary policy discourse concerned with 
the future of the profession,17 but we also find it throughout the history of philosophy – from 
Aristotle to Aquinas, from Kant to Hume, and in the under-utilized work of Lon L�Fuller� It is the 
idea that specific and particular problems relating to ethical means might be resolved by examining 
the generality of our ultimate ends� 
A Clinical Context for Guided Reflection
Our aim has been to articulate the nature of the interface that is required to connect the formal 
and unspecified acknowledgement of the importance of ethical skill with the substantive values 
required to bring about an autonomous understanding of them� This interface consists in what 
we have identified as the context and direction of guided reflection provided by familiarity 
with the ‘matrix of concerns’ that points practitioners towards underlying values� This guided 
reflection must operate within a suitable structure of clinical learning, and Donald Nicholson18 
has done much to forge a widespread acceptance of the general model which is shaped by the 
various insights of Wenger, Rest, and Merrit�19 Wenger’s notion of a ‘community of practice’ 
is perhaps the central structural consideration in modern educational theory� Learning occurs 
through a combination of the influence of the cultural environment and the process of negotiating 
meaning through participation and reification within this environment� But an ethically pristine 
‘community of practice’ does not arise spontaneously and automatically, ready to guide inexorably 
and productively towards autonomy� It should, of course, as Nicholson insists, encourage the kind 
of developmental virtues outlined in Rest’s model: the moral sensitivity, capable judgement, active 
commitment and courage required by ‘altru-ethical’ professionalism�20 But these virtues must 
function as much as the ability to resist institutional norms and pressures as to act in conformity 
with them; this is obvious, for a community can just as easily discourage and repress moral 
development as it can promote and sustain it� Thus autonomous ethical judgement must work 
from within and upon the community if it is to provide what Merrit refers to as a ‘sustaining social 
contribution to character,21 and this points us to substantive foundations and to the notion of a 
source of autonomous ethical insight prior to community� To be sure, there is a dialectic at work 
here, but not a paradox: reflection leads to autonomy, but reflection must be guided by substantive 
insight� This is best explained by augmenting Wenger and modifying Rest by introducing what 
17 See fn� 23 infra
18 See Nicolson, Donald J Teaching Ethics Clinically, (Teaching Ethics Clinically Without Breaking the Bank,) 
(2012)�, - www�teachinglegalethics�org - and more generally “Making Lawyers Moral : Ethical Codes and Moral 
Character” (Legal Studies Vol �25, No� 4, 2005) pp� 601-626
19 Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice : Learning Meaning and Identity (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1998); Rest, J� ‘Background: Theory and Research’� In Moral Development in the Professions J�R�Rest 
& D�Narvaez Eds �(Hillsdale, NJ: Ehrlbaum� 1994) pp�1-26; Maria Merrit “Virtue Ethics and Situationist 
Personality Psychology” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (3, 365 – 383, 2000) 
20 See fn� 16 supra
21 See Maria Merrit “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (3, 
365 – 383, 2000) 
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Vigotsky refers to as the ‘zone of proximal development’�22 This high-tech (sic?) phrase simply 
denotes that part of the process wherein a learner is empowered to achieve something by being 
provided with guidance without which they would have been unable to progress� Subsequent to 
this intervention and guidance, the zone of proximal development (proximate to the guidance or 
guide) becomes the zone of actual development� For our purposes, and in the context of ethical 
learning, the zone of actual development can be understood as progress towards the skills of ethical 
autonomy� 
The Ethical Dynamism of Law
When ethical reflection becomes focused it goes in search of substantive principle, when it finds 
it, substantive principle informs clinical judgement; we begin to move from ethical awareness in 
the simple practical involvement with a task to the beginnings of an autonomous understanding of 
the task and what is required for its comprehensive resolution� The formally irreproachable values 
of ethical professionalism attain a concrete and dynamic importance when through an interface 
they connect with the repository of the ethically substantive� We have suggested that critical 
engagement with the ‘matrix of concern’s points us in the direction of a repository of values that 
expansively underpin the idea of law itself� This is undoubtedly the right direction, as those charged 
with charting the future of the profession now seem to accept,23 and this sounds a lot like a job 
for ‘Jurisprudence’� One can expect antipathies to the colonization of legal ethics by Jurisprudence, 
and unease about the association between dogma and ethical substance, to intensify at this stage 
of the discussion� But this should not tempt us to evade or obscure the fact that the discipline 
of legal ethics appears to acknowledge that progress beyond mechanism and formalism must do 
more to connect the concept of professionalism with the theoretical relationship between legality 
and morality� This is the relationship that underpins the respect for individual worth implicit (and 
explicit) in the commitment to the Rule of Law� This is not to suggest that legal validity – even from 
the Idealist’s perspective – is to be regarded as synonymous with moral validity, nor is it to assume 
that professional legal ethics is simply another word for Jurisprudence and/or Moral Philosophy� 
In fact, to be effective, legal ethics must be circumscribed and differentiated as a discipline from 
the purely philosophical sciences� However, it must answer the questions it appears centrally to 
22 See L� S Vygotsky Mind in society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes� ( Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1978�) p�86)� Saul McLeod, says: The zone of proximal development ��� has been 
defined as “the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving 
and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance, or in 
collaboration with more capable peers” See S�A� McLeod The Zone of Proximal Development� http://www�
simplypsychology�org/Zone-of-Proximal-Development�html
23 In paragraphs 87 -89 of the LETR Discussion Paper 02/2012 at p� 30 we find: 
“Both the ACLEC Report and the more recent Economides and Rogers Report (2009), in their recommendations 
to bring ethics into the initial or academic stage of training for solicitors, have raised uncertainties about what 
that implies� Are we talking about individual professional ethics, per se, are we addressing the institutional 
ethical roles of the professions, judges and lawyers as a collectivity, or are we primarily concerned with the 
‘system ethics’ and values of law itself? This is reflected in Boon’s (2011) definition of legal ethics as��� 
The study of the relationship between morality and Law, the values underpinning the legal system, and the 
regulation of the legal services market, including the institutions, professional roles and ethics of the judiciary 
and legal professions� ���� 
If we accept that definition, all of these options are possible���” 
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set itself - especially about its rationale and method – and if in so doing, it must inevitably draw 
on the philosophical sciences, it must acknowledge its debt to them� 
In approaching our concluding remarks on this problem, however, it is worth noting that one very 
important substantive value is presented to us as a fait accompli requiring no philosophical effort 
of analysis whatsoever, namely the constitutional and moral issue of access to justice� It is in the 
context of a much reduced legal aid budget that our clinical students will encounter the general 
public and their legal needs� Whatever ‘justice’ might be, ‘access to it’ in a world of commodified 
legal services and limited funding generally means ‘being able to hire a skilled legal representative’ 
or be provided with one free of charge� On the premise that ‘access to justice’ in a constitutional 
system of laws (i�e� all such systems) means ideally, access to all who require it, or, realistically, 
as much of it as can feasibly be provided, and that a failure in this regard is unethical and 
unconstitutional, ‘legal professionals’ are ‘ethically underdeveloped’ to the extent to which they 
are unaware of this substantive failure� From here we can make a further connection to another 
aspect of our wish-list of virtues noted above by Rowe et al: namely, the ethical requirement for 
practitioners to ‘recogni[e] the broader implications of [their] work’� Reflection on these ‘broader 
implications’ leads to a wider remit for ‘considering the ‘interest and values of clients’ and ‘others’� 
Here, ironically, ‘others’ will increasingly denote persons who are unable to attain the status of 
being someone’s ‘client’� Thus, these days, ‘Access to Justice’ becomes automatically integrated 
into the notion of clinical legal education, and this substantive connection with formal ethical 
requirements appears to require no deeply theoretical justification: it is  simply accepted as a mark 
of well-rounded ethical professionalism� 
This natural current of sympathy is to be welcomed, but it should not lead us to believe that 
autonomous ethical judgement in the professions descends automatically upon all practitioners 
in all historical circumstances� Autonomy requires constant critical and deliberate reflection� 
Interestingly, however, the more closely we examine the jurisprudential rationale for maintaining 
access to justice and related constitutional and social entitlements, the more our fears about 
dogma and rigidity in engaging with substantive concerns are allayed� That is, what jurisprudential 
reflection on foundational values leads us to is not so much a list of conveniently concrete 
principles, but rather, insight into the method of their dynamic creation�
Our view is that the more clinical law students and practitioners come to understand the nature 
of rules, the more they understand what surrounds their ethical interpretation and application, 
and this surely must signal the start of the journey from the mechanical and formal grasp of the 
problem, towards the level of autonomous accomplishment required to deal with the problem 
professionally� There is, to be sure, a great deal that is unedifying in the traditional debates 
between Legal Positivism and Natural Law, but there is much to be learned from the challenge 
to law’s validity arising from the unavoidably ‘open texture’ of rules� It is this ‘open texture’ that 
fuels the perennial search for principles which are required to give semantic context and form to 
rules that will be, or might be, accorded the status of law� Positivists and Idealists might differ 
as to how, in preserving the distinction between law and morality, these principles might be 
incorporated as such in the form of procedurally recognisable sources, but what emerges from 
the debate is an acknowledgement, reluctant or otherwise, of the  nature of the recognition of 
sources� The educational, doctrinal, professional, procedural, and political problems of law are 
irreducibly ethical not simply because law is a form of normativity that demands pre-eminence and 
compliance, but because implicit in its every utterance is a claim to legitimacy� If the acquisition of 
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legal skills requires an understanding of the values that underpin the legal enterprise, an encounter 
with the philosophical method that seeks to identify these values must necessarily be seen to be of 
great practical importance�
Hart’s debate with Fuller24 about the ‘inner morality of law’ is as accessible as any, and this famous 
exchange devotes scrupulous critical attention to whether or not we can detect substantive ethical 
principle embedded in the very idea of a rule - regardless of its content� Once we invite Dworkin 
into this discussion the formal stability of the Black Letter gives way to a much more imaginative 
structure of creative interpretation where moral good sense reveals itself as legal substance in its 
own right� Dworkin’s famous example in Riggs v Palmer of the ethical integrity required to make 
coherent sense of seemingly straightforward probate rules is as valuable to our understanding as it 
is simple� We might point out to students that (in the USA) probate ‘law’ is to be ignored and the 
principle that, ‘a person should not profit from wrong doing”, is to override it where appropriate�25 
Mechanical knowledge of this particular judgement – or several similar to it – would surely be of 
practical and technical value, but it is not, of course, an indication that one has achieved a level 
of autonomous ethical maturity� Understanding from this illustration that the entire process of 
adjudication is structured by the constant search for cohesion between ethical principle and rules 
of general applicability, is, however, a step towards it, and it offers to clinical educationalists  a 
clue  as to how progress might be encouraged in this regard�
Bringing together the content of our model of the ‘matrix of concerns’ and establishing the direction 
of philosophical analysis exemplified in the debate between Hart, Fuller and Dworkin offers a 
simple but perfectly coherent example of we understand by an interface of guided reflection: it is a 
phase of experiential learning that can lead the clinical student to grasp the  by which mechanical 
and formal ethical requirements can be connected synthetically with substantive values� The 
interface could be said to amount to creating’ a zone of proximal development’� That can enable 
us to break the bonds of formalism in our educational literature and discourses� ‘Knowing the 
law’ is an indispensable element of technical skill, but once it is revealed and accepted that there 
is an ethical dynamism and a creativity necessarily inherent in bringing legal rules into legitimate 
existence, then, the search for ethical principle, or the search for coherent principle overall, 
becomes an integral part of the professional understanding of the nature of legal practice� 
24 H�L�A Hart “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” Harvard Law Review, Vol� 71, (I958)� 593-629 at 
p� 607� See, importantly Fuller’s methodological comments in reply: Lon L� Fuller “Positivism and Fidelity to
Law: A Reply to Professor Hart” Harvard Law Review, Vol� 71 No�4, 1958, pp� 630-672�
25 See Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 1977; also Law’s Empire 
( Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press 1986
